Abstract: This chapter draws the reader's attention to the
Exogenous Breakdown
Once begun, the now common assumption is that the path to democratisation is near irreversible or, at the very least, very difficult to reverse. Particularly where they have been properly consolidated, both conventional wisdom and empirical evidence states that no democracy should follow the example of an Athens or Weimar. If anything, democracies should emerge out of the rubble left by previous regimes and set about installing leaders via free and fair elections who are more representative of and ultimately directly answerable to the citizenry.
1 From this initial phase, which usually marks the transition from authoritarian to electoral politics, young democracies then tend to deepen and begin to display many of the liberal values that in time will become a defining feature of most mature democracies. This is what is meant by consolidation -when democracy is seen finally to be 'the only game in town' -and it is, as far as the thinking goes, the fate of all modern democracies.
Despite this, there is now both sufficient democratic discontent and hard statistical evidence to suggest that the path to democratisation can be and indeed has been reversed on more than a few occasions during the last half-century alone. Anecdotally, Georg Sorensen, a Danish expert on democratisation, asks us to '[c] onsider the consolidated democracies in the West, the heartland of victorious liberal democracy' .
2 Having done so, he believes that we would be 'forced to admit that there is no longer a vigorous political life in these countries' . Rather, as Sorensen continues, what there is in many consolidated democracies is 'a public debate characterized by diffidence and bereft of really significant issues' , so much so that, according to his diagnosis, 'the substance of democracy will simply dry up, and democracy in the West will become an increasingly empty shell of formal political practices. ' Writing much earlier than this -not long after the Second Wave of democratisation swept through post-World War II Europe -Zevedei Barbu predicted that many of the same processes and determinants which had first sparked the process of democratisation into action would eventually presage the onset of totalitarianism.
3 While the institutionalisation of a flexible way of life premised on freedom, individual reason and mutual respect offered hope for some, he believed that it would also arouse insecurities and anxieties in others. Adjusting to democracy was therefore no easy thing and, for those who yearned for less responsibility and more political stability, Barbu argued that the appeal of Fascism and Communism would grow.
Empirically speaking, we know that following all three of the main waves of democratisation during the twentieth century there were
